In the European Union in 2024, 21 of 27 member states recorded more deaths than births, according to Professor Sarah Harper, director of the Oxford Institute of Population Ageing. This phenomenon is not confined to Europe but is increasingly evident across Asia and the Americas, from Japan and South Korea to Cuba and Uruguay. It reflects two long-running demographic shifts: people are living longer, and the average number of children per woman—known as fertility—is falling.
The Tipping Point: What Happens When Deaths Outnumber Births?
The social and economic impact of these trends is already being felt worldwide. In Japan, companies now specialize in cleaning the apartments of elderly individuals who have died alone and remained undiscovered for weeks. Adult incontinence pads have outsold baby nappies for over a decade. In Italy, depopulating villages are selling homes for one euro to attract new residents and sustain local services. In the United Kingdom, falling pupil numbers are forcing school closures in parts of London.
These are not isolated curiosities but signs of a broader transformation. In the UK, the latest projections from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) indicate that deaths will outnumber births every year from 2026 onward. This is driven by declining fertility and the aging of the large postwar baby boom generation, which is now entering later life. The population is still expected to grow, but more slowly than previously forecast, peaking at around 72.5 million in 2054 before beginning a gradual decline. Earlier projections had suggested growth would continue until 2096.
Understanding the Demographic Shift
“Although the point where there are more deaths than births is emotionally significant, it’s part of a long process,” said Dr. Paul Morland, a demographer and author of No One Left: Why the World Needs More Children. Life expectancy has been rising since the late 18th century, while fertility has been declining since the late 19th century, aside from a brief mid-20th century rebound. “There comes a point when these two lines cross,” he explained.
The reasons for declining fertility are complex. A fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman is typically required for a population to replace itself over time. The UK rate currently stands at 1.44. “Recent fertility declines in the UK have been especially marked in those under 30, indicating some postponement,” said Professor Melanie Channon of the University of Bath. “However, even accounting for the trend towards later parenthood, fertility is still declining.”
These changes are already having tangible effects. “In the short run, those in sectors that serve children—maternity care, schools, childminders—and new parents are feeling the falling number of births,” said Dr. Bernice Kuang of the University of Southampton. Falling enrolment is forcing some schools to close, while businesses such as soft play centres and childminders are struggling. Even midwifery training is affected, as students must attend a minimum number of births.
Broader Economic and Social Implications
The consequences extend beyond children themselves. “Working parents—disproportionately mothers—may have to leave the labour force or reduce their hours,” Kuang noted, with implications for the economy and gender equality. Meanwhile, longer lifespans contribute to a gradual “greying” of the population. As populations age, Morland says, they tend to become more risk-averse, with investment flowing into safer assets rather than innovation. A smaller, older workforce may be less entrepreneurial and less able to sustain economic growth.
Pressures on public finances are also stark, with fewer workers supporting rising spending on pensions, health, and social care. Older people require far higher levels of support, placing a growing burden on younger workers. Consumption patterns shift as well: younger people tend to spend more on goods and appliances, whereas older people spend more on care and other services that cannot easily be automated or offshored. “Just as your labour force is drying up, you have more demands for local hands-on labour,” Morland said.
A Global Phenomenon
Many developed nations face similar pressures, but these trends have spread beyond the richest economies. In many middle- and lower-income countries, fertility is falling despite more limited economic development. Parts of Latin America, as well as countries like Jamaica and Thailand, and Indian states such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala, have fertility rates comparable to or lower than those in Britain. “There are countries that will grow old before they grow rich,” Morland observed.
This marks a shift in how demographic change unfolds. Historically, falling birthrates followed rising incomes, urbanisation, and education—the so-called demographic transition. But now fertility is declining more rapidly than economic development, driven in part by changing aspirations and social norms. Still, the pattern is not uniform. Israel maintains much higher birth rates—about three children per woman—suggesting that culture may play a role. The UK may also be more resilient than some neighbours. “There is a very strong and persistent two-child norm in the UK, which means our fertility rate is slightly more buoyant than some other European countries where single children are more accepted,” said Channon.
In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, fertility remains high and populations are growing rapidly, even as mortality declines. In parts of central Asia, economies have grown without the same decline in births. Migration also plays a crucial role. While deaths may outnumber births, the UK’s population is still expected to grow for now, largely due to net inward migration, albeit at lower levels than previously assumed.
Adapting to an Older Population
Demographic projections are not destiny. They do not account for unexpected shocks or policy shifts, and migration is particularly difficult to predict. As the ONS puts it: “Projections are not forecasts.” If the direction of travel is clear, the question becomes not whether demographic change can be reversed, but how societies respond to it.
Some changes are already “baked in,” reflecting what demographers call population momentum—the way large generations moving through populations continue to shape their size and age structure. “Population growth will slow down, but it will be a long time before it reverses,” said Kuang, pointing to China, where decades of low fertility have only recently translated into population decline.
This means there is time to act. Morland argues that countries with low fertility rates face difficult trade-offs between economic growth, migration, and birthrates—though others suggest the picture is more complex. Rather than trying to “fix” falling birthrates, policymakers should prepare for an older population—from rethinking how old age support is funded to enabling people to remain in work longer. “Simply telling people to have more babies is unlikely to work,” said Kuang.
These changes may need to be far-reaching. As Harper, author of the forthcoming book Ageing Societies: Risk and Resilience, puts it: “The main challenge is that 20th-century labour markets, pension systems, family norms, healthcare institutions and long-term care arrangements were built under demographic conditions that no longer prevail.” Adapting to longer lives will require rethinking how people work, retire, and are supported in later life. “The traditional linear life course—education, continuous employment, abrupt retirement—is increasingly obsolete,” said Harper.
Instead, longer lives may involve more flexible patterns of work, retraining, and phased retirement, alongside efforts to tackle ageism and support lifelong learning. Redesigning homes, transport, and public spaces to support independence and connection in later life is also essential.
Supporting Families and Migration
Even if telling people to have more children is unlikely to work, there may be ways to support them in having the children they want. “Everyone should have the right to decide how many children they have, and when,” said Channon. Yet many are unable to do so: in three-quarters of surveyed countries, more than 40% of women end their reproductive lives with fewer children than they would like, reflecting economic insecurity, work-family conflict, and wider social constraints. Policies that support families, particularly affordable childcare and parental leave, can make a difference, said Channon, but are more effective at helping people realise their intentions than dramatically raising birthrates.
She and others also call for more comprehensive reproductive health education in schools, noting that “curricula often don’t include important topics such as fertility, preconception health, pregnancy and miscarriage,” which might impact young people’s ability to make informed choices.
Migration can help ease labour shortages in the short term, as those who move for work are typically young and economically active, but it is not a magic bullet. Migrants also age, meaning a fixed level of migration would not be enough to keep pace with reduced fertility and an ageing population. “I am also wary of the ethics of encouraging migrants to come to the UK solely to fill labour gaps while making a path to settlement, or any kind of viable long-term future here, extremely difficult,” said Kuang. Others point to wider ethical questions, including the impact on countries that lose skilled workers to richer economies.
The good news is that demographic change rarely arrives with a jolt. It unfolds gradually until its effects are visible everywhere—in classrooms, in health and social care, and in the shifting relationships between generations. The question now is whether those changes continue to accumulate quietly, or whether governments and societies begin to confront them more openly and work on ways to adapt.
